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A SUGGESTED ROLE FOR REBUTTABLE
PRESUMPTIONS IN ANTITRUST RESTRAINT
OF TRADE LITIGATION
The United States, having abandoned its contention that the re-
straints in the present case are per se violations of the Sherman Act,
now urges "a standard of presumptive illegality," presumably on the
basis of a showing that a product has been distributed by means of
arrangements for territorial exclusivity and restricted retail and whole-
sale customers. We do not consider this additional subtlety which was
not advanced in the trial court. The burden of proof in antitrust cases
remains with the plaintiff, deriving such help as may be available in
the circumstances from particularized rules articulated by law-such
as the per se doctrine. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,
While the burden of proof is a significant aspect of adjudication
in every field of law,2 perhaps nowhere as in the area of civil antitrust
restraint of trade litigation is the allocation of the burden such a
central element in each controversy. Yet because the burden of proof
in restraint of trade cases is allocated by means of rules with substan-
tive content as well, the question of the procedural adequacy of those
rules is largely overlooked.
The basic supposition underlying enforcement of section 1 of the
Sherman Act3 is that it prohibits only those business practices which
threaten to impose unreasonable restraints on trade. Although such
an interpretation was at first rejected by the courts,4 it is true, as
1. 388 U.S. 365, 374 n.4 (1967).
2. Courts often resort to burden of proof rules because:
[plolicies can be promoted or stifled smoothly, quietly, and without controversy. This
befits judicial decorum . . . .Hence burden-of-proof rules can be effective levers for
law reform, operating with both little friction and little greasing. Krier, Environmental
Litigation and the Burden of Proof, LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 108 (M. Baldwin &
J. Page eds. 1970).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
4. In one of the earliest Sherman Act cases, United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n,
166 U.S. 290 (1897), the Court stated:
It is now . . . urged that the statute, in declaring illegal every combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce, does not
mean what the language used therein plainly imports, but that it only means to declare
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Justice Brandeis later pointed out, that practically all commercial
agreements result in some form of trade restraintY The question
before the courts in restraint of trade suits, therefore, is presently
conceived as being whether the challenged business activity, viewed
in the light of reason, and after a consideration of those effects which
injure competition and those which work some public benefit, should
be deemed an unreasonable restraint on industrial competition. Upon
the party initiating such a suit is placed a procedural burden, the
"burden of going forward"-that is, the plaintiff must present evi-
dence to support the basic allegation of the complaint. More impor-
tant, the same party generally must discharge the "burden of persua-
sion," demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that an
unreasonable restraint is being effected.6 Thus, the typical suit in-
volves the presentation by the Government or by a private party
plaintiff of a massive collection of material, a presentation by the
defendant of equally massive amounts of rebuttal material, followed
by an exhaustive legal-economic analysis of all the evidence by the
court.7 However, after the analysis of a particular business activity
has repeatedly resulted in a finding that the activity is, on the whole,
pernicious, the courts adopt a per se rule as to that activity, and hold
that such practice, whenever it is shown to have occurred, is per se a
violation of the antitrust laws. When the per se rule controls, the
defendant is not permitted to present evidence in rebuttal, no weigh-
ing of the activity's harmful and benign effects is done, and the bur-
den of persuasion originally allocated to the plaintiff is conclusively
inferred to have been satisfied by the mere showing that the defendant
illegal any such contract which is in unreasonable restraint of trade, while leaving all
others unaffected by the provisions of the act. . . . The term is not of such limited
significance. Id. at 327-38.
5. Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to
restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed
is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the Court
must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S.
231, 238 (1918).
6. See generally C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 306-22 (1954).
7. Prolonged proceedings and a massive record are almost inevitable if an anti-
trust controversy is carried to court; for the rules of law that have been developed,
with respect to both the offense and the proof which may be adduced, generally permit
the entire history of a major company or industry to be placed in issue. McAllister, The
Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 HARV. L. REV. 27 (1950).
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has engaged in the proscribed conduct.
Considering the judiciary's flexibility in moving from the so-
called "rule of reason" to the application of a per se prohibition, it
is surprising to discover that the courts are unwilling to consider any
intermediate position between the "rule of reason" and the per se
rule. Such an intermediate position would logically be filled by the
development of rebuttable presumptions of illegality.' Perhaps such
a position has been ignored because the courts view the mixed conclu-
sions of fact and law that embody the "rule of reason" and the per
se rule as having substantive, or fact-weighing, effects only and neg-
lect the fact-producing-that is, the procedural and eviden-
tiary-elements that are also inherent in the rules.9 A second reason
that such presumptions have not been utilized may be the open ques-
tion which still embroils the experts in the law of evidence as to the
substantive weight such presumptions should possess.1 ° Finally, as the
above excerpt from the Schwinn case suggests, a standard of pre-
sumptive illegality may have failed to develop simply because its
adoption has not been vigorously advocated at the trial level. In spite
of their lack of acceptance, however, rebuttable presumptions offer
the possibility of a more flexible approach to restraint of trade litiga-
tion, which would, in turn, more effectively carry out the important
public policies that form the basis for the antitrust laws.
While there are numerous business practices which are now held
to be per se violations of the antitrust statutes," many more practices
8. The willingness of courts to adopt such an approach in other contexts to protect impor-
tant public interests is illustrated by Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc.,
48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966). Normally in a condemnation proceeding the party seeking
to enjoin the condemnation is required to show that the condemnor's decision was unreasona-
ble. However, in Texas East Transmission, where a natural gas utility company had already
condemned lands running through the heart of a private wildlife preserve for new pipe lines,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey placed the burden of proving the reasonableness of the route
on the utility after a showing by the condemnees that (1) serious damage to the preserve would
occur, and (2) an apparently reasonable alternative existed. The court insinuated that the
public's interest in preserving wilderness tracts raised a presumption of unreasonableness
against the utility's proposed pipe site. 48 N.J. at 264, 225 A.2d at 135.
9. One need go no further than the labels which have been attached to the rules for evidence
of the court's preoccupation with the substantive content of the rules: The per se rule, though
it is seldom spoken of as such, could just as well be termed an irrebuttable presumption, the
"rule of reason" being but a term for the more normal allocation of the burden of proof.
10. See notes 53-65 infra and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (horizontal
territorial divisions); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (group boycotts);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price-fixing arrangements);
International Business Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (tie-ins).
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have not yet been labeled "per se illegal" either because they are new
and little data concerning them is available, or because after careful
analysis reasonable-minded scholars and judges have not agreed that
their overall effect is always inherently harmful." Often, most of the
factual material with regard to the latter practices, and in particular
the reasons for their implementation, is solely within the possession
of the defendants. Thus, in suits in which these business practices are
involved, a procedure whereby the plaintiff is required to convince
judges that there has been an unreasonable restraint of trade may
work an unfairness to the party bringing the suit and may seriously
harm the area of commercial activity involved. A system which per-
mits a plaintiff to rely upon a rebuttable presumption of illegality in
those situations-for example, in which most of the factual material
determinative of the reasonableness of an activity is in the hands of
the defendant-would constitute an eminently fair method of allocat-
ing burdens of proof. On the other hand, from the antitrust defen-
dant's point of view, particular factual settings seem so clearly to
create valid exceptions to per se prohibitions-for example, tie-in
arrangements used by a fledgling company in marketing a new and
risky product 3 -that permitting the defendant in such a situation to
introduce evidence to overcome a rebuttable persumption against
him rather than conclusively presuming his conduct to be illegal
might add a much-needed spur to competition in many commercial
fields."
This Note will first summarize the present approach to the alloca-
tion of the burden of proof in restraint of trade cases and the state
of the law with respect to rebuttable presumptions. Next considered
will be two areas of antitrust litigation-that arising under section 2
of the anti-monopolization provision of the Sherman Act, and that
under the Robinson-Patman Act-in which "rebuttable presump-
tions" have gained limited support. Finally, four specific restraint of
trade situations under section 1 of the Sherman Act will be examined
to demonstrate how the development of a rebuttable presumption in
12. E.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966) (acquisition by one company
of another in the same line of business); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320
(1961) (total requirements contracts); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258
U.S. 346 (1922) (partial vertical integration through exclusive dealing arrangements).
13. See notes 120-25 infra and accompanying text.
14. "The Supreme Court shows a growing determination in its antitrust decisions to convert
laws designed to promote competition into laws which regulate or hamper the competitive
process." Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77 YALn
L.J. 70 (1967).
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each situation would lead to more equitable results.
The "Rule of Reason": Present Alternatives
Both the Sherman Act and later antitrust statutes were popular
reactions to the ruthless display of naked self-interest that character-
ized the actions of many of America's entrepreneuers and industrial-
ists in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 5 Most Americans had
early accepted the tenets of Adam Smith's laissez-faire philosophy,
particularly its emphasis on unbridled competition as the necessary
conditon for the fullest development of the nation's economic poten-
tial. 6 Therefore, any business practice which diminished industrial
competition, whether in the form of the state-imposed monopolies of
the eighteenth century or the post-civil war attempts by private busi-
nessmen to garner monopoly profits for themselves by agreements
not to compete, was viewed as antithetical to the basic American
preference for unfettered trade. The language of the Sherman Act
reveals an intent to proscribe all activities which would restrain com-
petition. 7 The Supreme Court originally interpreted the Act quite
literally, namely, that all restraints on trade were forbidden. 8 How-
ever, the Court soon retreated from that position and accepted the
view that Congress had outlawed only those business practices which
placed an unreasonable restraint on competition within a particular
but substantial geographic area." Since the "rule of reason" was the
touchstone of the burden of proof in each suit, it became the duty of
a court, when adjudicating a suit involving a restraint of trade claim,
to weigh the respective benefits to both the practitioners and the
general public of the business practice under attack against the harm-
15. "The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade." Northern Pac. Ry.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
16. "[Competition] will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest
prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing
an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social in-
stitutions." Id.
17. "Throughout the history of these [antitrust] statutes it has been constantly assumed that
one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of cost, an
organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete with each other." United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
18. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
19. The "rule of reason" was introduced into antitrust jurisprudence by Chief Justice White
in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 68 (1911): "Unaided by the
light of reason it is impossible to understand how the statute may in the future be
enforced and the public policy which it establishes be made efficacious."
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ful effects the practice would have upon other competitors and the
economic system as a whole. The practice could be condemned only
after a thorough economic analysis of the volume of economic activ-
ity affected, the relevant product markets and geographic markets
involved and the effects on actual and potential competitors, and
after product users demonstrated that the overall effect of the chal-
lenged practice would work an unreasonable restraint upon competi-
tion within the industry.
Such an approach by the courts is necessary because many types
of business activities may constitute an unreasonable restraint of
trade within one given market and yet in no way lessen competition
within another market. 2 For example, in an industry characterized
by a large number of financially healthy raw material processors and
secondary fabricators, the vertical acquisition by one of the raw ma-
terial processors of a secondary fabricator might have little or no
effect on the ability of the other fabricators to remain competitive.
Indeed, such vertical integration is quite typical of business today and
is generally permitted. However, in a situation where only a small
number of major raw material processors supply a vast number of
small, economically unstable secondary fabricators, acquisition by
one of the material processors of a fabricator might give the acquired
fabricator significant competitive advantages over non-integrated ri-
vals. These advantages would be due to greater financial resources
and the advantages of integrated operation, including the opportunity
to impose a "price squeeze" on non-integrated competitors by main-
taining raw material prices at high levels and finished product prices
at depressed levels.21
A second example of business arrangements reasonable in one
setting but not in another is that of requirements contracts, wherein
one company agrees to purchase exclusively from one supplier certain
materials that are essential to its operation. In circumstances where
the competitors of the supplying company can easily cultivate their
own channels of distribution-for example, where other purchasers
with large demands are relatively abundant-a foreclosure of the
20. Experience with existing laws had taught that definition [i.e., the perse rule], being
necessarily rigid, would prove embarrassing and, if rigorously applied, might involve
great hardship. Methods of competition which could be unfair in one industry, under
certain circumstances, might, when adopted in another industry, or even the same indus-
try under different circumstances, be entirely unobjectionable. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S.
421, 436 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
21. See, e.g., Reynolds Metal Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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competing suppliers from one marketing target would probably have
little adverse effect on those competitors and would clearly be within
the law.22 In a sense, every purchase of goods forecloses the competi-
tors of the company supplying the goods from that particular sale,
and obviously not all such sales could be called unreasonable. 23 On
the other hand, where the requirements contract accounts for such a
large percentage of the available market, and especially where such
a contract is imposed by a dominant seller upon a weak purchaser,
the foreclosure could quite rightly be viewed as an unreasonable re-
straint on trade.24
The "rule of reason" is also warranted with respect to those new
modes of commercial enterprise as to which information regarding
the overall impact on the industrial sector affected is still insufficient
for the courts to proscribe the practices out of hand. For example, in
recent years a large number of America's major corporations have
sought to diversify their interests by acquiring companies operating
in fields other than that of the parent company.25 Although such
acquisitions are neither horizontal nor vertical mergers, it has been
asserted26 that they may still threaten competition within the product
industry in which the newly-acquired company operates by making
available to that company the vast financial resources and bargaining
power possessed by the conglomeration as a whole. Such cases as
FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,27 in which the acquisition by a
major processed-food retailer of a dehydrated garlic and onion com-
pany was held illegal because the retailer was thereby in a position
to compel its supplying food processors to make reciprocal purchases
of the garlic and onion products for their own processing, demon-
22. See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 242 (1959).
23. See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS 146-47 (1955).
24. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); cf. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville
Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
25. See, e.g., Loescher, Geographical Market Extension Acquisitions, in Hearings on Eco-
nomic Concentration, Part I, Mergers and Other Factors Affecting Industry Concentration,
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess., at 830-40 (1965); Edwards, Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, in
BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 239 (1955).
26. See Mueller, Mergers Among Large Firms, in Hearings on Economic Concentra-
tion, Part II, Mergers and Other Factors Affecting Industry Concehtration, Before
the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess., at 515-20 (1965).
27. 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
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strate the general awareness of courts that situations involving con-
glomerate mergers may result in unreasonable restraints on trade.2"
At present, however, because some business motives underlying such
acquisitions-particularly the need for corporations to diversify in
order to free themselves from cyclical patterns of stagnation and
growth and from an over-dependence upon a product which could be
made obsolete by advancing technology-are obviously legitimate
business concerns, such multi-industry aggregations have generally
not been attacked as violative of the antitrust laws.
It is evident that the economic situations described above require
the courts to maintain the "rule of reason" as an important tool in
the adjudication of restraint of trade cases. However, not long after
the initiation of litigation under the antitrust statutes, courts began
to recognize that certain business practices were such patently unrea-
sonable restrictions upon industrial competition that continual de-
tailed analyses of the full economic effects of the practices within the
particular factual setting involved were unnecessary. Thus, a second
aspect of the problem of burden of proof in restraint of trade litiga-
tion developed.
The Per Se Rule
Significantly, the per se rule was not developed because the Su-
preme Court deemed itself able to recognize on first scrutiny that
certain types of conduct had no other purpose and effect than to
restrain competition; rather, the rule was established with regard to
a particular business practice after a number of investigations regard-
ing that practice consistently resulted in the conclusion that such
conduct held no benefits for the public or the industry as a whole but
instead tended to give the practitioner an undue competitive edge over
its rivals. 29 For example, the decision in Board of Trade v. United
States3 seemed for a time to irfiply that certain forms of limited
price-fixing would be permitted. 31 However, in United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co.,32 which involved price-fixing by companies
that controlled 82 percent of the vitreous pottery business in the
28. Cf. FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
29. Cf. VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS- 69-81 (1966); Note, Section
Two of the Sherman Act-Is a Per Se Test Feasible?, 50 IOWA L. REV. 1196, 1199-200 (1965).
30. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
31. But see text accompanying note 41 infra.
32. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
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country, Justice Stone articulated for the majority of the Supreme
Court the underlying philosophy of a new approach:
Agreements which create such potential [monopoly] power may well be held
to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity
of minute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable...
and without placing on the government . . . the burden of ascertaining from
day to day whether. . . [the price] has become unreasonable through the mere
variation of economic conditions.'
In 1940 the decision in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.34
made the assumption in Trenton Potteries explicit:
Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the
effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a com-
modity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se."5
Since Socony- Vacuum, the per se doctrine has been extended to pro-
hibit a number of other business practices deemed to have as their
purpose and effect the imposition of unreasonable restraints upon
trade. The per se category of antitrust violations consists of:
agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competi-
tion and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unrea-
sonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use.36
Such practices as tying arrangements,37 horizontal division of mar-
kets,38 group boycotts, 39 and vertically imposed territorial limita-
tions on resale ° have all been brought within the strictures of the rule.
The per se rule, however, is not invoked immediately upon the
plaintiff's alleging acts by the defendant which traditionally would fit
within one of the areas absolutely proscribed. The plaintiff must first
demonstrate that the practice actually is within the bounds of a cate-
gory of activities to which the per se rule applies. To decide this
question the "rule of reason" itself is utilized, and the pertinent facts
surrounding the practice, including the defendant's purpose and in-
33. Id. at 397-98 (emphasis added).
34. 310 U.S. 150 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 223.
36. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
37. See, e.g., id.; International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); United States v. American
Smelting & Ref. Co., 182 F. Supp. 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
39. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Radiant Burn-
ers, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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tentions, are scrutinized. If this examination results in a finding that
the challenged activity is indeed within one of the categories deemed
per se illegal, the plaintiffs burden is satisfied. Thus, although the
practice attacked in Board of Trade v. United States did "fix" prices
in the sense that commodities buyers who made their purchases after
the cessation of the regular trading day were all required to pay the
same price-namely, the closing exchange price for that day-the
exchange rule in no way "set" the actual price itself.4 Examined in
the light of the "rule of reason," the exchange rule was not such an
arrangement as came within the traditional concept of "price-
fixing, '42 but rather was merely a means for ensuring an orderly
market in the commodities.
Analyzing the per se rule from an evidentiary point of view, it can
be seen as nothing more than a judicial formulation of a peculiar kind
of irrebuttable presumption. Once the plaintiff has established by
evidence that the defendant's actions fit within a particular pattern
of conduct, the presumption that that conduct is an unreasonable
restraint on trade becomes controlling, evidence in rebuttal becomes
immaterial, and a judgment for the plaintiff must be rendered."
Beyond doubt the rule is valuable in saving the courts time and in
protecting the public interest from anticompetitve activities clearly
without any "honestly industrial" purpose. However, because of the
powerful judgment-rendering effect the per se rule possesses, the
courts are unwilling to release such a potent weapon on behalf of the
plaintiff except when, beyond any doubt, the activity challenged mer-
its such an approach." This may account for the decision of some
41. The Court stated:
[The Government] made no attempt to show that the rule was designed to or that it had
the effect of limiting the amount of grain shipped to Chicago; or of retarding or acceler-
ating shipments; or of raising or depressing prices; or of discriminating against any part
of the public; or that it resulted in hardship to anyone. 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
42. See also Judge Medina's opinion in United States.v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621
(S.D.N.Y. 1953), a case in which the Government had contended that an "illegal per se" price-
fixing arrangement had been created by contractual arrangements obligating the members of
an investment banking syndicate to adhere to prescribed prices in marketing securities which
the syndicate was organized to distribute. Judge Medina stated, "I can find nothing in any of
these cases which would permit me to conclude that the rule of reason has been abandoned or
discarded." Id. at 689. Applying the "rule of reason," the court determined that the agreements
were not anti-competitive either in purpose or effect.
43. The rule differs from other irrebuttable presumptions only in that it involves a mixed
conclusion of law and fact-that is, it involves both a factual inference that a restraint of trade
has occurred and a conclusion of law that the restraint was unreasonable.
44. See Von Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine-An Emerging Philosophy ofAnt itrust Law,
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courts not to use the per se rule in certain circumstances although the
defendant's conduct clearly has anticompetitive effects,45 thus throw-
ing back on the plaintiff the full burden of proving that the conduct
constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade.
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTIONS: A THIRD ALTERNATIVE
Legal presumptions" are inferences of fact that courts will recog-
nize to exist when the facts necessary to give rise to the presumption
have been proven to exist.47 The law is replete with presumptions-for
example, a man whose absence is unexplained for seven years is dead,
a child under the age of seven is incapable of forming the mens rea
necessary for a conviction of murder, and a person found dead did
not commit suicide. The use of any particular presumption is based
on one or more of the following reasons:4" (1) probability-that is,
experience has demonstrated that if fact A is true it is highly probable
that inference B is also true;49 (2) procedural convenience-for exam-
ple, it saves time to presume that a criminal defendant is sane;5" (3)
fairness in allocating the burden of producing evidence upon the party
who has superior access to it;5 and (4) notions of social and economic
policy, usually implicit rather than expressed.-2
The key problem with respect to presumptions that has kept the
courts and commentators locked in furious debate is the question of
how much weight a presumption should be said to possess. Some
II U.C.L.A.L. REV. 569 (1964), in which the author grimly warns of the danger in an
overzealous application of the per se rule.
45. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
46. See generally 9 J. WIGMORE, TREATISE ON EVIDENCE §§ 2483-98 (1940); C. McCoR-
MICK, supra note 6, §§ 306-22; Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5 VAND. L. REV.
324 (1952); Morgan, How to Approach Burden of Proof and Presumptions, 25 ROCKY MT. L.
REV. 34 (1952); Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REV. 906
(1931).
W17. [A] presumption is a standardized practice, under *hich certain oft-recurring
fact groupings are held to call for uniform treatment whenever they occur, with respect
to their effect as proof to support issues. McCormick, Charges on Presumptions and
Burden of Proof, 5 N.C.L. REV. 291, 295 (1927).
48. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 309; Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REV.
255, 257 (1937).
49. See, e.g., Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Brantley, 231 Ala. 554, 165 So. 834 (1936); Price v.
Price, 156 Pa. 617, 27 A. 291 (1893).
50. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
51. See, e.g., Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933); Bowman v. Vandiver, 243 Ky. 139, 47
S.W.2d 947 (1932).
52. See, e.g., Oklahoma Ry. v. Guthrie, 175 Okla. 40, 52 P.2d 18 (1935); Guyer v. Synder,
133 Md. 19, 104 A. 116 (1918).
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presumptions present no problem because they are irrebuttable; 3 the
inference at the heart of the presumption will stand as proven in spite
of all the evidence that might have been introduced to the contrary. 4
It would appear that the per se rules developed in antitrust law are
of this variety, although they are not usually characterized as such.
Thus, when the Government shows in its case that a number of com-
peting companies have willfully agreed to establish the price at which
they will sell a particular item, the court will hold, in effect, that from
the fact of price-fixing there arises an inference that an unreasonable
restraint of trade has been created55 which dictates the outcome of the
case, notwithstanding benefits to the public or de minimis harm to
competition which the defendants might believe they could demon-
strate. However, if a presumption is rebuttable, the question becomes
what measure of evidence to the contrary need be presented to rebut
the inference that it raises. The most authoritative commentators in
the field of evidence have never agreed on this point.
Professors Thayer 6 and Wigmore57 have presented the view that
a permissive presumption of law should have no substantive eviden-
tiary value.58 In other words, the presumption has only procedural
consequences;" it gets the case past the judge to the jury, and when
it has operated as such it is functus officio.6" Thus, when evidence is
introduced to rebut the presumption-however weak the evidence
may be-the presumption is overcome and destroyed.6 ' Quite aptly
this doctrine is known as the "bursting bubble" theory. Professor
Morgan, on the other hand, asserted that the presumption does have
substantive evidentiary value;"2 moreover, he argued that the effect
53. Professor McCormick refers to such presumptions as "mandatory presumptions,"
while non-mandatory presumptions are termed "permissive." McCormick, supra note 47, at
297.
54. The presumption of death from seven years' absence unheard from is usually considered
mandatory. C. MCCORMICK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 609 n.12 (3d
ed. 1956). See, e.g., Simpson v. Simpson, 162 Va. 621, 175 S.E. 320 (1934).
55. This inference is a conclusion of both fact and law. See note 43 supra.
56. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 336 (1898).
57. J. WIGMORE, supra note 46, §§ 2490-91.
58. Ryan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 206 Minn. 562, 289 N.W. 557 (1939); Wright v.
Bridges, 16 Tenn. App. 576, 65 S.W.2d 265 (1933).
59. See Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Sieg, 53 F.2d 318 (6th Cir. 1931).
60. Such a presumption has been likened to a male bee; after functioning, it disappears.
Wyckoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 173 Ore. 592, 147 P.2d 227 (1944).
61. There has been much criticism of this view. See, e.g., Cleary, Presuming and Pleading:
An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 18 (1959).
62. Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV.
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of the presumption was actually to shift the burden of persua-
sion 63-that is, once the presumption was raised it stood until suffi-
cient evidence was presented to make it more likely than not that the
presumptive inference was not true. 4 Although the language in many
cases is often contradictory or unclear, probably the most commonly
accepted view is that of a modified Morgan approach, namely, that
the presumption has substantive evidentiary value but it does not have
the effect of shifting the burden of persuasion to the party against
whom the presumption operates.6 5
The burden of proof in antitrust litigation is determined by either
the "rule of reason" or the per se rule. Both rules are also substantive
rules of law that determine whether evidence introduced by the plain-
tiff should be held to require the inference that the defendant's con-
duct is unreasonable. Therefore, if rebuttable presumptions are to be
similarly utilized in antitrust litigation, Professor Morgan's
theory-that the presumption itself may stand as evidence from
which the trier of fact can infer the illegality of defendant's conduct,
in spite of contrary evidence introduced to rebut it-would be con-
vincing. The central question in an antitrust suit cannot be answered
by basic sensory impressions, as the question "Did X strike Y?." could
909 (1937). For cases adopting a view similar to that of Professor Morgan, see Arkimo Lumber
Co. v. Luckett, 201 Ark. 140, 143 S.W.2d 1107 (1940); Mitchell v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio,
135 Ohio St. 110, 19 N.E.2d 769 (1939); Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Prieto, 169
Tenn. 124, 83 S.W.2d 251 (1935); Worth v. Worth, 48 Wyo. 441, 49 P.2d 649 (1935).
63. The "burden of persuasion" is synomyous with the "burden of proof." See Rule 1,
UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE (1953).
64. Professor Morgan believed that there should be a general rule "that the sole effect of
every presumption shall be to place upon the opponent the burden of persuading the trier of
fact of the nonexistence of the presumed fact." Morgan & Maguire, supra note 62, at 913.
Rule 14 of the UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE (1953), apparently a compromise between
the Wigmore and Morgan views, provides as follows:
Rule 14. Effect of Presumptions.
Subject to Rule 16, and except for presumptions which are conclusive or irrebuttable
under the rules of law from which they arise, (a) if the facts from which the presumption
is derived have any probative value as evidence of the existence of the presumed fact,
the presumption continues to exist and the burden of establishing the non-existence of
the presumed fact is upon the party against whom the presumption operates, (b) if the
facts from which the presumption arises have no probative value as evidence of the
presumed fact, the presumption does not exist when evidence is introduced which would
support a finding of the non-existence of the presumed fact, and the fact which would
be otherwise presumed shall be determined from the evidence exactly as if no presump-
tion was or had ever been involved.
See In re Lundvall's Estate, 242 Iowa 430, 46 N.W.2d 535 (1951).
65. See, e.g., Grieger v. Vega, 153 Tei. 486, 271 S.W.2d 85 (1954); Nichols v. Winfrey, 90
Mo. 403, 2 S.W. 305 (1886).
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be by the direct observation of an eyewitness; nor can it be resolved
by a scientific experiment. Rather, the question "Does the particular
action challenged create an unreasonable restraint of trade?" calls for
a factual determination of a conclusory, interpretive nature, based on
a complex analysis of numerous complicated factors. As a result, in
practically every situation the defendant could present some evidence
that would leave the issue in doubt. Therefore, if the Thayer-
Wigmore "bursting-bubble" theory, in which the presumption has no
substantive value, were used, in every case the presumption would
readily and easily be extinguished.
If rebuttable presumptions are to be used in antitrust litigation at
all, the use of full Morgan-type presumptions-that is, presumptions
that shift the burden of persuasion to the party against whom the
presumption operates-seems particularly appropriate in view of the
mixed conclusion of law and fact which the inference of an unreason-
able restraint of trade entails. The use of such presumptions in the
antitrust context can be justified on at least three grounds. First, in
many situations the facts necessary to prove an antitrust violation are
within the sole possession of the defendant. For example, a steel
purchaser would have no access to information needed to determine
whether a price increase by a major steel producer matched by similar
increases by other steel producers is a result of "conscious parallel-
ism," 6 -that is, decisions made independently, and therefore le-
gally, by each producer but with the action of competitors in
mind-or the result of illegal agreements made by the companies to
fix the price of the product throughout the industry. 7 Requiring the
steel producers in such a situation to rebut a presumption of illegality
arising from the parallel price increases by presenting evidence dem-
onstrating that their decisions were, in fact, independently arrived at,
would be a fair means for removing the hurdle confronting the plain-
tiff attempting to meet his burden of proof.
A second reason for adopting an intermediate position is to pres-
ent the courts with a tool that will better ensure competition in certain
areas which have not yet come within the ambit of the per se rule.
The need for such a device has developed because of the greatly
66. For an analysis of the problem of "conscious parallelism" and "price leadership" in
the steel industry, see W. ADAMS, THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 148 et seq. (1954).
67. For an excellent discussion of this problem, see Turner, The Definition of Agreement
Under the Sherman Act. Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REv. 655
(1962).
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increased centralization of economic power around a relatively small
number of corporate entities that has occurred in recent years. When
this is viewed against a background of rapidly accelerating interde-
pendence of all facets of American society, the vast potential harm
that a small group of selfish businessmen could render becomes
frightfully evident. Thus a public policy against harmful restraints of
trade even stronger than that currently maintained, embodied in the
form of rebuttable presumptions, could be developed and sustained
by the courts.
Third, because any rule of law, including those governing the issue
of burden of proof in antitrust cases, must by its nature be general,
one can hardly expect it to deal adequately with every factual situa-
tion that may arise. 8 Undoubtedly, situations exist where precedent
seemingly demands implementation of the per se rule, while the pecu-
liar facts of the case would ensure that utilization of that rule actually
hinders rather than promotes competition.69 Permitting a court in
such a situation to choose the intermediate position of a rebuttable
presumption would provide the flexibility required without throwing
the burden of persuasion back onto the plaintiff.
Despite the availability of such a potent and flexible tool, the
courts have nevertheless decided to choose only between the per se
rule and the "rule of reason." That other alternatives are feasible is
shown by the fact that a number of scholars and judges have already
proposed the use of rebuttable presumptions in the limited area of
monopoly control70 and that the very language of the Robinson-
Patman Act requires such an approach for cases involving selling
price differentials.7 The role of the rebuttable presumption in these
two areas shall now be briefly considered, followed by illustrations
in the broad area of restraint of trade litigation of the usefulness of
such a presumption.
68. See generally Elman, "Petrified Opinions" and Competitive Realities, 66 COLUM. L.
REv. 625 (1966), where the author states:
It should be plain why there is a real danger of the abuse of the per se principle by those
pre-disposed to offer mechanical or dogmatic solutions to legal problems. In every
antitrust case there are two routes to a finding of illegality: critically analyzing the
competitive effects and possible justifications of the challenged practice; or subsuming
it under one of the per se rules. The latter route is naturally the more tempting; it is
easier to classify a practice in a forbidden category than to demonstrate from the ground
up, as it were, why it is against public policy and should be forbidden. Id. at 627.
69. See notes 104-08 infra and accompanying text.
70. See notes 76-87 infra and accompanying text.
71. See notes 88-91 infra.
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Monopolies, Selling Price Differentials, and the Rebuttable Pre-
sumption
Section 2 of the Sherman Act declares it illegal for anyone to
monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or conspire to monopolize any
part of interstate and foreign commerce. Thus, the Act literally pro-
hibits conduct, not the occurence of a condition that results from such
conduct. However, when one successfully "monopolizes," he causes
a particular factual occurrence, that of the acquisition of "monopoly
control," to come about. For this reason, many suits brought under
section 2 attempt to demonstrate that the defendant's past conduct
was "monopolizing" by proving that the defendant now wields "mo-
nopoly control."
The acquisition of monopoly control over a product, however, is
an activity that may or may not violate the antitrust laws, depending
upon the factual setting in which it occurs. It is quite possible for
there to be only one producer of an item within a significant market
area because no one else has sought to produce the same item. It
would be preposterous to suggest that such a monopoly situation is
a kind that the Sherman Act prohibits. There are also situations, as
Judge Learned Hand explained in the landmark case, United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America,72 in which a company might legiti-
mately acquire monopoly control over a product, even in the face of
active competition, because of that company's "superior skill, fore-
sight, and industry. ' 73 The courts recognize that a monopoly thus
"thrust upon' 7 a company is a form of monopoly which the Sherman
Act does not forbid. Because a company made the subject of a com-
plaint under section 2 of the Sherman Act may have these legitimate
defenses available, a per se approach to monopoly control is impossi-
ble.
Nevertheless, evidence of monopoly control over a product con-
tinues to be an essential element in section 2 actions. A determination
that a company has acquired monopoly control over a product is the
result of arduous analysis by the trier of fact after mountains of
conflicting evidence have been presented by the two parties to the
suit. Key indications that a company has acquired monopoly control
are that the company has been able to compel competitors to follow
72. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
73. Id. at 430.
74. Id. at 429.
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its lead in price and marketing policies, and that the company has
been able to significantly raise its prices without suffering losses in
sales. However, probably the most common indication of monopoly
power which the courts look for is a company's ability to exclude
anyone else from entering the relevant market, as reflected by the
company's share of the sales of the product under consideration.'
And it is with reference to this indicator that suggestions have been
forthcoming that a rebuttable presumption of illegality be utilized.
Such a suggestion formed the basis for the district court opinion
in United States v. Grinnell Co.," a case in which the defendant was
shown to have acquired control over eighty-seven percent of the rele-
vant product market.7 7 According to Judge Wyzanski:
[m]ost of the cognoscenti have expected that a day would come when the
Supreme Court would announce that where one or more persons acting jointly
had acquired so clear a dominance in a market as to have the power to exclude
competition therefrom, there was a rebuttable presumption that such power
had been criminally acquired and was a monopolizing punishable under § 2
.... [S]uch a rebuttable presumption rests on the by-now dozens of court
records which make it quite clear that it is the highly exceptional case, a rara
avis more often found in academic groves than in the thickets of business,
where monopoly power was thrust upon an enterprise. .... Is
In Judge Wyzanski's opinion, both the burden of going forward and
the burden of persuasion are to shift in such a situation. 9 According
to Judge Wyzanski:
[o]nce the Government has borne the burden of proving what is the relevant
market and how predominant a share of that market defendant has, it follows
that there are rebuttable presumptions that defendant has monopoly power
and has monopolized in violation of section 2. The Government need not
prove, and in a well-conducted trial ought not to be allowed to consume time
in needlessly proving, defendant's predatory tactics, if any, or defendant's
pricing, or production, or selling, or leasing, or marketing, or financial policies
75. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966), where the Court stated:
"In United States v. Du Pont & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391, we defined monopoly power as 'the
power to control prices or exclude competition.' The existence of such power ordinarily may
be inferred from the predominant share of the market."
76. 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964).
77. Although it has been asserted that Judge Hand's opinion in the Aluminum Co. case
rested solely on the view that the defendant's control of 90% of the virgin aluminum ingot
market created a presumption that Alcoa was an illegal monopoly, Bowman, Toward Less
Monopoly, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 577, 583 (1953), Judge Hand's thorough analysis of Alcoa's
aacquisitions and other business practices that enabled it to maintain its dominant position rebut
such a supposition. See Note, supra note 29, at 1206 n.75.
78. 236 F. Supp. at 248.
79. Id.
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while in this predominate role. If defendant wishes to go forward, it is free to
do so and to maintain the burden of showing that its eminence is traceable to
such highly respectable causes as superiority in means and methods which are
"honestly industrial. . .. "-0
However, on appeal the Supreme Court stated that the consideration
of a rebuttable. presumption established solely by demonstration of
the firms' -present *market share was unnecessary since there was
abundant evidence to show that Grinnell's monopoly power was ille-
gally acquired.8
Notwithstanding the disposition of the Grinnell case on appeal, a
number of cases and commentators have suggested a similar ap-
proach to that proposed by Judge Wyzanski, asserting that when it
is shown that the defendant controls a particular percentage" of the
product considered, then the rebuttable presumption should arise that
such vast control was the result of illegal aggrandizement, placing
upon the defendant the burden of justifying the control which it pos-
sesses. One such suggestion is that a presumption of illegality should
be applied against firms producing more than ten to fifteen, percent
of a product for a given market in which there are numerous competi-
tors. This approach, it is argued, would eliminate a major gap that
has existed in antitrust enforcement-applicability to nonconspiracy
oligopolies.1' A slightly different proposal," while not setting out any
percentage limitations, asserts that where a group of oligopolists
working in concert, either collusively or through some form of "price
leadership," or a dominant single firm, is shown to possess unreason-
able "market power," 85 a presumption should arise that such power
was acquired and is now being maintained in violation of the Sher-
man Act. 8 It would then fall to the defendants to show that their
80. Id. For a thorough critique of the Wyzanski rule, see Note, supra note 29.
81. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 n.7 (1966).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,424 (2d Cir. 1945),
where the court stated: "That percentage [over 90%] is enough to constitute a monopoly; it
is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough; and certainly thirty-three
percent is not enough."
83. Bowman, supra note 77, at 589.
84. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 22, at 111-13.
85. A firm possesses market power when it can behave persistently in a manner different
from the behavior that a competitive market would enforce on a firm facing otherwise similar
cost and demand conditions. Id. at 75.
86. The enforcing agency would be required to demonstrate that the firm (or firms) under
examination possessed market power by:
(I) delimiting the market in which the firms operate and by describing the character-
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market power was reasonable, due to economies of scale, patents, or
introduction of new products, processes, or techniques.87
One area of antitrust law which has given explicit recognition, in
the form of legislation, to the use of rebuttable presumptions is the
Robinson-Patman Act'ssI prohibition against selling-price differen-
tials. A major exception to the presumption arises where the differ-
ence is justified by lower handling costs resulting from a particular
method of sale. Specifically, a vendor cannot sell his goods to a large-
volume purchaser at a cost per unit less than the cost per unit which
a small-volume purchaser would pay unless actual economies-for
example, those resulting from less handling or packaging per basic
unit-accrue when the product is sold in great quantities. 9 If the
vendor does sell his basic units at more than one price, he must bear
the burden of proving, in any suit brought against him by a small-
volume purchaser, that actual economies did occur in selling at large
volume." Thus, where the plaintiff-purchaser shows that the vendor
has offered goods to a large-volume competitor at a price lower than
that offered to the plaintiff, a presumption arises that this selling
istics of the demand which they meet;
(2) establishing the average market share of the group and the individual firms over
the period under study, and noting any trends in market shares;
(3) examining the conditions of entry into the market, the conditions of expansion
and output for firms other than the respondents, and the actual history of entry and
nonentry;
(4) when a group of firms is involved, showing that the market is such that they do
in fact act jointly to exercise market power, rather than in such a way as to limit each
other's power;
(5) testing the conclusions of (1) through (4) against the relevant dimensions of
performance, price-cost margins, in the aggregate and for separate products and sub-
markets; output-capacity relations; capacity-demand relations; technical efficiency. Id.
at 112.
87. Id. at 113.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970). See generally, W. PATMAN, COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1963); F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN ACT (1962, Supp. 1964); H. TAGGART, PRICE JUSTIFICATION (1959).
89. The exception reads:
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only
due allowance for differences in cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the
differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold
or delivered . . . . Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
90. Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that there
has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting
the prima facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged
with a violation of this section. . . . Id. § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1970).
See also Howrey, The Robinson-Patman Act and a Prima Facie Case, 37 GEO. L.J. 541 (1949).
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price differential resulted from anti-competitive motives and con-
duct-for example, from pressure exerted by the large-volume pur-
chaser-rather than from actual economies accruing from selling on
a massive scale. Only if the seller can present sufficient evidence to
rebut this presumption will the selling price differential be validated.9
The Rebuttable Presumption in Restraint of Trade Cases: Four Il-
lustrations
The rebuttable presumption, legislatively required in certain
Robinson-Patman cases, recommended by many in monopoly cases,
but largely ignored by the courts in handling most antitrust cases,
could also be utilized to provide efficiency in administration and
fairness in the area of restraint of trade litigation. This section will
consider four restraint of trade situations as illustrations: product
certification, vertically imposed territorial restrictions, maximum
resale price-setting, and tie-ins.
Product Certification. Product certification-the labeling by a
trade association or other group of a product to show that it meets
certain quality standards-plays a major role in modern American
industry." The importance of certification has increased as money
from the federal government has become available to finance projects
once left to private development. For example, in order for federal
funds for low-income housing to be procured, the developers must
meet specific standards established by the particular federal agency
involved with the program. In almost every instance the standards
regarding materials or procedures to be used in an area, whether
selected by trade associations or the federal government, reflect the
91. Emphasizing the elements of fairness and public policy, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378, cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945),
stated:
It is true that § 2(a) makes price discrimination unlawful only in case it lessens, or tends
to prevent, competition with the merchant who engages in the practice; and that no
doubt means that the lower price must prevent, or tend to prevent, competitors from
taking business away from the merchant which they might have got, had the merchant
not lowered his price below what he was charging elsewhere. But that is often hard to
prove; the accuser must show that there were competitors whom the higher of the two
prices would, or might, not have defeated, but who could not meet the lower. Hence
Congress adopted the common device in such cases of shifting the burden of proof to
anyone who sets two prices, and who probably knows why he has done so, and what
has been the result. Id. at 379.
Compare FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966), with Quaker Oats Co., 66 F.T.C. 1131
(1964), and Universal-Rundle Corp., 65 F.T.C. 924 (1964).
92. See generally Bodner, Antitrust Restrictions on Trade Association Membership and
Participation, 54 A.B.A.J. 27 (1968).
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materials or procedures being used by most of the private concerns
working in that area. For example, the commercial standards ap-
proved and published by the Department of Commerce are not the
results of irdependent tests made by the Department; rather, they
reflect the consensus of the industry. Generally, the Department will
not designate a standard unless it is approved by at least seventy-five
percent of the producers of the product.13 While little antitrust litiga-
tion has arisen with respect to product certification, one fairly recent
case, Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Ass'n,"4
demonstrates how the practice might act as a restraint on trade and
how the use of a rebuttable presumption would result in a far more
equitable outcome than is the case under the "rule of reason."
In 1957 Structural Laminates, Inc. constructed a mill and com-
menced the production of 3-ply, one-half inch sheathing construction
plywood. This plywood was made of three pieces of relatively low
grade veneer, each one-sixth inch thick, glued together. However, at
the time the most commonly used one-half inch sheathing was made
of five pieces of veneer, each one-tenth inch thick. Accordingly, the
Department of Commerce had adopted Douglas Fir Plywood Com-
mercial Standard 45, which held that only 5-ply sheathing, and not
3-ply, was acceptable for one-half inch sheathing. Companies meet-
ing the Department's Commercial Standard could stamp their prod-
uct to that effect, and sheathing without such marking was more
difficult to sell and brought a lower price. The Douglas Fir Plywood
Association, a trade association of over one hundred plywood manu-
facturers that produced eighty-two to eighty-nine percent of all soft
plywood in the United States, had been instrumental in the adoption
of CS 45. It had reported to the Department of Commerce that
because of gluing and drying difficulties resulting from industry-wide
use of roller-type dryers, 3-ply, one-half inch sheathing was not ade-
quate for construction purposes. Nevertheless, in 1957 Structural
Laminates commenced production of its 3-ply product, having con-
ducted tests which demonstrated that the new kiln-type dryer it had
installed eliminated the difficulties that had previously rendered 3-
ply, one-half inch sheathing unacceptable. Its sheathing was able to
pass the CS 45 performance tests conducted both by Structural and
an independent, reputable testing agency, prompting Structural to
93. See Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Ass'n, 261 F. Supp. 154, 156
(D. Ore. 1966).
94. Id.
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press the Association for a review of CS 45 to include 3-ply, one-half
inch sheathing. The Association refused, and it was not until 1963,
after the Association's technical staff had run a number of separate
tests on Structural's product, that CS 45 was amended to include 3-
ply, one-half inch sheathing. However, because of the unwillingness
of purchasers to consider its product, Structural Laminates had
ceased operating in 1960. Structural decided to bring suit against the
Association, charging that it had unreasonably restrained trade by
refusing to recommend a revision of CS 45. Despite Structural's
ability to show that many of the Association's members had large
inventories of one-tenth inch veneer and had therefore benefited from
the refusal to alter CS 45, and that one-sixth inch veneers had been
accepted in 1958 in other plywood thicknesses, it was unable to con-
vince the Structural Laminates court that the Association's action
was unreasonable. The court asserted that because the other mills did
not have kiln-type dryers and lacked familiarity with the newly devel-
oped glues, it was reasonable for the Association to believe that the
industry in 1958 was not ready as a whole to produce a satisfactory
3-ply, one-half inch sheathing.
It would appear that Structural, although presenting an arguable
case, was unsuccessful in its suit because it was unable to satisfy its
burden of proving that the Association had acted unreasonably. How-
ever, it seems clear that if CS 45 had been amended to include 3-ply
one-half inch sheathing, only such sheathing that could also pass the
CS 45 performance tests would have met CS 45 standards, so the fact
that the other mills could not produce a 3-ply sheathing that could
meet CS 45 standards should not have rendered Structural's shea-
thing unacceptable. Because of the great power of groups like the
Douglas Fir Plywood Association to prevent competition threatened
by dynamic and innovative companies, utilization of a rebuttable
presumption would be quite appropriate in this situation. Upon plain-
tiff's showing that its product had met or surpassed the performance
requirements of the applicable commercial standard, and that it had
requested the Association to seek an amendment of the Standard, a
rebuttable presumption should arise that the Association's failure to
take the necessary action resulted from a desire to prevent the entry
of a new competitive product into the industry. In practically every
instance the Association itself, not the complainant, would possess
the necessary information as to why the alteration had not been
recommended. Further, the benefits accruing to most of the members
of the Association by maintaining the status quo are obvious. Finally,
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since the commercial standards themselves are, in a real sense, re-
straints on trade, it would appear fair to place on the Association, in
situations where that body is generally responsible for adoption of the
appropriate "commercial standards, the burden of proving that refus-
ing to alter the industry standard to permit the entry of a new product
or method was not unreasonable under the circumstances.
Vertically Imposed Territorial Restrictions. As far back as
1899, when the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,9 5 horizontal territorial restric-
tions-agreements by competing companies to eliminate commercial
warfare between each other by restricting the marketing of each com-
petitor to a geographically limited area-have been recognized as
simply "naked restraints of trade." 6 However, the problem of
vertically imposed territorial restrictions-restrictive agreements be-
tween suppliers and resalers as to the territorial distribution of a given
product-is far more complicated."7 One major facet of the far-
reaching determination by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co."' was that a manufacturer may limit the
marketing territory of dealers handling its products on a consignment
basis-that is, in a manner indistinguishable from that of agents or
salesmen of the manufacturer-without running afoul of the antitrust
law. An equally significant aspect of Schwinn was the Court's deci-
sion that if the manufacturer sold the product to the dealer, so that
the dealer was not acting as an agent of the manufacturer but as an
independent businessman with his own wares to sell, any attempt by
the manufacturer to impose limits as to the geographical territory
within which the dealer could resell the product would constitute a
per se violation of the Sherman Act.9 9 This latter decision came as a
mild shock to those in the antitrust field, for just four years earlier,
in White Motor Co. v. United States,"'0 the Court had stated that
evidence was insufficient to categorize such a vertically imposed re-
95. 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
96. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1962). See also Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
97. See Jordan, Exclusive and Restricted Sales Areas Under the Antitrust Laws, 9
U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 111 (1962); McLaren, Territorial Restrictions, Exclusive Dealing, and Re-
lated Sales Distribution Problems Under the Antitrust Laws, 11 PRAC. LAW. 79 (no. 4, 1965);
Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public Policy
Standards, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 506 (1965).
98. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
99. Id. at 379.
100. 372 U.S. 253, 261-64 (1963), rev'g 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
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striction as a per se violation.
The White Motor Co. case, like Schwinn, dealt with vertically
imposed territorial restrictions on the dealer's resale of a product.
The district court granted summary judgment against the defendant
manufacturer, adopting the Government's view 10' that the restrictions
were illegal per se.1°2 On review, the Supreme Court refused to sanc-
tion the territorial restriction scheme; however, it also refused to
affirm the district court's decision and held that the applicable rule
of law as to burden of proof should be designated only after a full
trial had been held. Because the case was the first involving verti-
cally imposed territorial restrictions that the Court had ever con-
sidered, it asserted that it did not
know enough of the economic and business stuff out of which these arrange-
ments emerge to be certain. They may be too dangerous to sanction or they
may be allowable protections against aggressive competitors or the only prac-
ticable means a small company has for breaking into or staying in business
. . . and within the "rule of reason." We need to know more than we do about
the actual impact of these arrangements on competition to decide whether they
. . . should be classified as per se violations of the Sherman Act.103
Just four years later and with little or no more experience in
deciding cases involving similar vertically imposed territorial restric-
tions,10' the Supreme Court evidently decided that it had acquired
sufficient knowledge and expertise in the area to brand such restric-
tions on resale by dealers as per se violations. Justice Fortas, speak-
101. Even the Government had recognized that not all the considerations relevant to the
validity of a particular form of restraint could be presented by a summary proceeding. Its brief
provided:
What is the importance of interbrand as opposed to intrabrand competition? ... Will
White's restrictions remain reasonable if its share of the market increases? ... These
are only a few of the issues relevant to the trial of the "reasonableness" of any particular
set of territorial restrictions. Nor could one be content with a single investigation.
Business conditions change. The effect of restricting competition among dealers today
may be different tomorrow. Brief for the United States at 31-32, quoted in 372 U.S.
253 at 266 n.3.
102. 194 F. Supp. at 585-88.
103. 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
104. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) where Justice
Stewart, dissenting, argued:
The Court today is unable to give any reason why, only four years later, this precedent
should be overruled. Surely, we have not in this short interim accumulated sufficient new
experience or insight to justify embracing a rule automatically invalidating any vertical
restraints in a distribution system based on sales to wholesalers and retailers. . . . In-
deed, the Court does not cite or discuss any new data that might support such a radical
change. Id. at 389.
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ing for the majority in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.10 5
stated that the per se rule had been applied because the specific
illustrations articulated in the White Motor Co. case as possible
factors relevant to a showing that a "rule of reason" approach was
appropriate-namely, the existence of a small company struggling
against much larger competitors or a new company attempting to
break into the market-were not present. Since the restrictions oper-
ated as mere "naked" restraints imposed by one party on the aliena-
bility of property owned by another, they were, beyond question,
unreasonable.""
Justice Stewart, dissenting, pointed out that the district court had
explicitly followed the dictates of White Motor Co. and, after a full
exploration of the effects of the Schwinn restriction plan, had decided
that the ultimate effect of the defendant's policies was to enhance
rather than undermine or destroy competition. "No previous anti-
trust decision of this Court," wrote Justice Stewart, "justifies its
action."10 7
Most interesting in Schwinn was the majority's use of the per se
rule even though the Government itself had abandoned such an ap-
proach after the district court had rejected it. Although on appeal the
Government had urged the adoption of a "standard of presumptive
illegality," or a rebuttable presumption, the majority chose not to
consider this "additional subtlety." As a result, the Court was left to
choose either of the two extremes. Sensing instinctively that some-
thing in the Schwinn scheme smacked of illegality, but fearing that
to put the Government to the full proof in such a confusing and
uncharted area would probably mean that the unreasonableness of
the Schwinn restrictions would not be sufficiently exposed, the Court
seemingly ignored White Motor Co., and imposed an absolute rule.
If a rebuttable presumption had been utilized, Schwinn would have
had opportunity to present evidence, as suggested by Justice Brennan
in White Motor Co.,' that might justify its restrictions. In addition,
105. Id.
106. Justice Stewart, dissenting, id. at 391-92, further pointed out that even at common law,
only unreasonable restrictions imposed by one party on another's right to alienate his property
were illegal.
107. Id. at 388.
108. Possible justifications for such territorial restrictions which Justice Brennan delineated
in his .concurring opinion in White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 268-69 (1963),
are the promotion of vigorous inter-brand competition fostered by the added incentive of
exclusive territory given to dealers, and the encouragement of the marketing of new and risky
products by distributors due to guarantees of territorial insulation.
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if the totality of the evidence presented left the entire issue in doubt,
as was quite likely to happen in an area in which courts have had
practically no experience, the presumption would have stood unrebut-
ted and the majority's instinctive dislike for the plan vindicated, with
no rude jolt to the judicial nervous system as unfortunately occurred.
Maximum Resale Price-Setting. Maximum resale price-setting
is a third area in which the either-or approach has brought about
results which are antithetical to the goal of fostering commercial
competition. Dicta in cases involving minimum price-setting,"3 had
indicated that any schemes to fetter the purchaser-seller's freedom to
fix the prices at which they would sell, by imposing either minimum
price floors or maximum price ceilings, were restraints that could
have no significant justification and therefore were illegal per se.
Thus, Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons,"0 the first case to
actually deal with maximum price-setting, held that any scheme
achieving such a result was likewise absolutely forbidden."' The Su-
preme Court has recognized that schemes to fix maximum resale
prices, by substituting the possibly erroneous judgment of a producer
for the forces of the competitive market, may severely limit the abil-
ity of purchaser-sellers to survive in the market. Maximum prices
may be set so low that the dealer is unable to furnish services or
conveniences which consumers desire and for which they are willing
to pay. In addition, the resale price may be set at such a level that
only large-volume sellers can afford to offer the product, thus elimi-
nating the competition furnished by less efficient, smaller volume
dealers." 2 Consequently, the Court was unwilling to require the vic-
tims of such schemes to assume the burden imposed by the "rule of
reason."
However, the second, and latest, decision by the Supreme Court
on maximum resale price-setting, Albrecht v. Herald Co.,"' demon-
strates that the extension of the per se doctrine into this area may
have been a mistake, and that fixing the burden of proof through a
rebuttable presumption of illegality may be a sounder approach.
109. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221-24 (1940); United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927).
110. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
11. "[Agreements to fix maximum prices] no less than those to fix minimum prices,
cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their
own judgment. "Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951).
112. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968).
113. Id.
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Albrecht involved a metropolitan newspaper cancelling the distribu-
torship of a company, which delivered its papers, because the com-
pany refused to comply with the maximum subscription prices which
the newspaper had set. Following a rather shallow analysis which
relied for the most part on Kiefer-Stewart, the majority of the Court
held that the newspaper's attempt to fix maximum prices was per se
illegal. Justice Harlan, in a well-reasoned dissent, argued that use of
the per se rule was inappropriate." 4 He pointed out that because of
the nature of the business, the plaintiff-distributor in Albrecht had an
exclusive monopoly within a limited geographic area for delivery of
the defendant's newspapers. Thus, the only way the newspaper's con-
sumers could be protected from being charged "supercompetitive"
prices and the newspaper protected from losing its sales volume-the
distributor preferred to make his profit by selling fewer papers at a
higher price-was for the newspaper to set a maximum resale price.
The distinction between the effect of minimum and maximum price-
fixing, explained Justice Harlan, was so significant that the same
conclusive presumption of illegality should not be applied to both. 15
While minimum price floors are invariably harmful on balance, price
ceilings do not usually lessen horizontal competition; instead, they
drive prices down toward levels that would normally be set by intense
competition, thus preventing dealers in a monopoly situation, as was
the plaintiff, from reaping monopoly profits."'
A second distinction between maximum and minimum price-
fixing is that minimum price floors are usually beneficial only to
dealers involved in horizontal competition because they assure that
even in the most intense competition prices will not be undercut below
a certain level. Thus, it is proper in most instances to infer from a
minimum price-setting scheme that horizontally competing dealers
have conspired to restrain trade"7 so that a per se prohibition is
justified. However, maximum price-setting plans do nothing to lessen
the price competition between horizontally competing dealers, and
114. Id. at 156-68.
I15. Id. at 166-67.
116. In his dissent Justice Stewart noted that the majority found the defendant guilty of
not permitting the plaintiff an absolute, uncontrolled monopoly. "The Court in this case," he
wrote, "does more, I think than simply depart from the rule of reason. . . . The Court today
stands the Sherman Act on its head." Id. at 170.
117. See Turner, supra note 67. Professor Turner argues that what apparently is a unilateral
attempt by a manufacturer to impose minimum resale prices by refusing to deal with non-
complying dealers quite often is a tacit agreement between the manufacturer and his dealers
to set the minimum price. Id. at 689.
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they are almost always vertically imposed by a manufacturer acting
unilaterally to insure that the highest volume of its product sales will
be achieved. Therefore, the inference from the existence of a maxi-
mum price-setting plan of a conspiracy to restrain trade is clearly not
warranted. This being the case, dropping the per se rule and utilizing
a standard of proof that would permit the manufacturer to present
evidence to justify his price-setting plan would appear sound. If a
complete retreat in this situation from the per se rule to the "rule of
reason" is a leap which the Court believes it should not undertake,
then shifting to a middle position, one in which a rebuttable presump-
tion of illegality would be utilized, appears to be the most sensible
step for the Court to take.
Tying Arrangements. One further area in which a rebuttable
presumption of illegality might serve as a sound alternative to the
present either-or approach involves certain tying arrangements. A tie-
in is merely a requirement imposed upon a purchaser of one product
that he also purchase another, often, but not necessarily, related
product from the seller. In the leading tie-in case, Northern Pacific
Railway Co. v. United States,"' the defendant sold and leased land
on the condition that the grantee or lessee use defendant's facilities
for shipping all commodities produced or manufactured on the land,
provided that defendant's rates and services were no higher than those
of competitors. The Supreme Court sustained a summary judgment
against the railroad, holding that such tying arrangements were per
se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act."9 Since that case the
per se rule has been generally utilized in litigation involving tying
arrangements. However, peculiar factual situations may render the
flat imposition of a per se approach unwise and utilization of rebutta-
ble presumptions of illegality far more judicious.
For example, in 1948 Jerrold Electronics Corporation was formed
to produce and sell a newly developed television antenna booster
designed to improve television reception in fringe areas by amplifying
118. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
119. The Court stated:
They [tying arrangements] are unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has
sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free
competition in the market for the tied product and a "not insubstantial" amount of
interstate commerce is affected. Id. at 6.
See also International Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); International
Business Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); Turner, The Validity of Tying
Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REv. 50 (1958).
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the weak signals already available there. After a few initial successes
had been widely publicized, representatives of a large number of
communities in the fringe areas pressed Jerrold to install complete
community antenna systems in their towns. The systems were highly
technical and involved extremely sensitive and complicated equip-
ment. Jerrold was one of the first companies in a new industry with
vast potential, but its owners knew that a few major failures at the
outset would damage its reputation and thus might jeopardize the
company's entire future. They therefore decided to sell the antennas
only to purchasing groups that would agree to have all installation
and servicing of the equipment done by Jerrold servicemen. To com-
plement this policy the company refused to sell the components of its
system piecemeal, requiring the purchaser to obtain the entire pack-
age from Jerrold. In 1957 the United States Government brought suit
against Jerrold, alleging that the requirement that purchasers of the
Jerrold antennas also have all installation and servicing done by Jer-
rold, and that Jerrold's refusal to sell parts of its system other than
as a complete package, constituted tying arrangements and thus were
per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The district court opinion in United States v. Jeriold Electronics
Corp.,"' acknowledged that, although the per se rule was usually
applied to such arrangements and the necessary prerequisites for
imposition of the rule 2' had been established, because of the "rather
unique circumstances" in the case another approach would be uti-
lized.' Under traditional antitrust theory, if the per se approach is
abandoned, then the "rule of reason" comes into play, the plaintiff
having the burden of proving that the defendant's practices are unrea-
sonable restraints on trade. However, Judge Van Dusen, rejecting this
either-or approach, held that the per se rule was not applicable be-
cause of the peculiar factual setting, and thus the defendant, not the
plaintiff, should bear the burden of proving that its actions were not
120. 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff d 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
121. See notes 118-19 supra.
122. 187 F. Supp. 545 at 556. The court reasoned:
Any judicially, as opposed to legislatively, declaredper se rule is not conclusively binding
on this court as to any set of facts not basically the same as those in the cases in which
the rule was applied. . . .Therefore, while the per se rule should be followed in almost
all cases, the court must always be conscious of the fact that a case might arise in which
the facts indicate that an injustice would be done by blindly accepting the per se rule.
Id.
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unreasonable.'2 Analytically, upon a showing of actions generally
considered violative per se of the antitrust laws, a rebuttable pre-
sumption of illegality was held to have arisen in favor of the Govern-
ment, which could only be overcome by defendant's proof of facts
sufficient to demonstrate that its actions were not unreasonable com-
mercial restraints. Because, as Judge Van Dusen pointed out, the tie-
in was instituted in the launching of a new business with a highly
uncertain future, it was necessary to insure that the defendant's repu-
tation was not irreparably damaged by early failures resulting from
improper installation and servicing by independent servicemen . 4
Undoubtedly Judge Van Dusen was correct in assessing that use of
the per se rule in such a situation would have been sacrificing a
reasonable business practice to an inappropriate but supposedly con-
trolling legal structure.'2
CONCLUSION
The antitrust statutes that Congress has formulated set forth gen-
eral directives for courts to follow in the policing of competition
within the American economy. Congress left to the courts the job of
fashioning precise substantive rules to allocate the burden of proof
in suits arising under those statutes, and the courts have responded
with notable insight in developing an irrebuttable presumption in the
form of the per se rule from the original "rule of reason." However,
many years have passed since the per se rule was added as an alterna-
tive in allocating the burden of proof in antitrust litigation. Years of
additional adjudication have demonstrated that freezing the alloca-
tion within the either-or option embodied by the "rule of reason" and
the per se rule may have resulted in an undesirable rigidity.
Utilization of a rebuttable presumption of illegality that shifts the
burden of proof to the defendant is a third alternative which should
be adopted by the courts as a necessary complement to the burden
of proof rules now being used in antitrust litigation. Adoption of such
an approach would maintain the courts' flexibility in formulating
rules of procedure in this important area of law. It would also place
123. Id. at 560.
124. Id. at 557.
125. The Supreme Court has apparently sanctioned Judge Van Dusen's approach, by citing
theJerrold case for the proposition that in cases involving a small company attempting to break
into or stay in business, something less than a per se approach might be appropriate. White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
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the burden of proof in many situations upon the party who, because
of its sole access to information, should be required to shoulder such
a burden. In addition, adoption of such a rule would permit the courts
to protect adequately the vital American interest in open and compe-
titive enterprise, an interest which is being challenged by novel com-
mercial practices whose total economic effects are still too unclear
to warrant being declared inherently inimicable but nevertheless pose
obvious and significant dangers to unfettered trade. Finally, such an
approach would put an end to the gross injustice of utilizing the per
se rule in exceptional situations to prohibit a defendant from present-
ing evidence which could clearly demonstrate that on balance the
effect of the challenged practice is to foster rather than to inhibit the
competitive forces of the marketplace.

